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Brazil is the Third World's largest debtor, owing nearly 
$107 billion to industrialized nations. The debt crisis has had 
a severe impact on Brazil, changing it from, Ha society that 
has been generally defined by optimism and high standards of 
economic achievement to one now dominated by pessimism and lack
\\ iof perspective.' All sectors of society, especially the banks, 
businesses, and government officials have been seriously affect­
ed by the debt crisis. The Brazilian people in particular have
suffered as percapita income levels have fallen back to 1976 
2levels. The debt crisis has placed a great strain upon the 
economic system and has now become the main obstacle to economic
3development. Because of their lack of foreign reserves, Brazil 
has suspended interest payments until better terms are reached 
with banks. The prospects for Brazil gettingout of the present 
crisis are uncertain. Whether economic recovery is in store for 
Brazil remains to be answered. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the crisis to understand its background and the possibility 
of resolving it.
It is commonly believed that the Brazilian and world debt 
crisis began in the 1970s with the massive bank lending and 
subsequent world recession and oil crisis. However, long before 
Brazil made headlines in the 1970s, they had already been 
experiencing balance of payments difficulties and debt problems.
In fact, by the beginning of the 1960s, Brazil's foreign debt had
2already reached more than $2 billion. It is therefore necessary 
to examine Brazil's past economic policies in order to understand 
the current crisis. Of particular importance is the Import 
Substitution Industrialization policy which caused serious 
economic distortions and imbalances that policymakers later had 
to contend with in order to insure continued growth and develop­
ment .
Prior to 1930, Brazil's role in the international economy 
was as an exporter of primary products such as coffee, coccu, 
sugar, tobacco and cotton. Brazil assumed this role because of 
the small scale of its internal market and the insufficient 
technological and cultural base inherited from the colonial
5period. As a result of this position in the world economy, 
Brazil's economic prosperity became tied to the performance and 
demand of industrialized countries. In fact, Brazil's dependence 
on its export sector was of such magnitude that changes in the 
earnings of the country's principal exports had strong positive 
or negative effects on the entire economy. During the 1940s, 
however, the outlook for Brazil's future export markets worsened 
as an unfavorable worldwide trend for primary products developed. 
In addition, Brazil's share of the world market for its main 
export products declined. This decline was due to the increased 
number of competitors who entered the international market 
because of the high coffee prices after the postwar period when 
Brazil dominated the world market.
As a result, Brazil found itself not only among the nations 
whose exports steadily lost in the share of world trade, but also
4
3among those countries whose exports had little chance of regain-
7ing their former preeminence. Policymakers realized that high 
growth rates could no longer be achieved by relying on the export 
of primary products. It was in this context that the government 
decided to change the economic structure by promoting import 
substitution industrialization.
By implementing an import substitution industrialization 
strategy, Brazil's growth would supposedly become less dependent 
on the industrial centers of the world. It was hoped that a 
Brazilian industrial revolution would lead to greater economic 
independence as well as further economic and industrial growth.
Under this policy, Brazil's approach to development became 
"inward looking," emphasizing the development of a domestic 
productive capacity for as many formerly imported manufactured
pproducts as possible. Specific attention was focused on the 
internal production of more sophisticated consumer durable goods 
and basic inputs. In order to protect domestic industrialists, 
the government built extremely high tariff walls around the 
domestic market. By the 1960s, for example, tariff rates for
9manufactured products became as high as 184% in Brazil*
As tariff and exchange barriers were imposed, foreign 
companies were faced with two choicesj they could either make 
large industrial investments in Brazil or they could lose 
Brazilian markets altogether. Because of the large and protect­
ed market, foreign companies chose the first option. Increased 
foreign investment also resulted from the government's economic 
policy which favored foreign enterprises over domestic ones through
4major exchange, tariff, fiscal, and credit incentives. As
a result, direct foreign investment became an important source of
12economic growth for Brazil through the 1960s.
The industrialization process brought about by import
substitution industrialization resulted in high economic growth
rates for Brazil. Economic development occured as per capita
income increased and real wages and levels of consumption grew 
13as well. Between 1940 and 1961, Brazil's Gross Domestic
14Product grew 232 percent, more than tripling. Brazil's 
economy experienced much growth during this period.
By the mid-1960e, however, import substitution industrial­
ization began to lose its dynamism. It began to fail as a 
viable economic policy because the number of import substitution
possibilities diminished. Until the 1960s, it was relatively
15easy to start a new industrial enterprise in Brazil. Invest­
ors only needed to find a product that had previously been import­
ed and acquire the technology required to make it. After 
saturating the Brazilian market with domestically produced goods, 
the number of products 1 hat could be produced by ISI decreased. 
This was a result of the limited number of remaining imported 
goods that could be produced efficiently in Brazil or else 
could not be produced because of the huge investments needed by 
entrepreneurs. As a result of the lack of new investment 
possibilities, foreign and domestic investment decreased 
substantially. The amount of gross investments fell from 
around 16.5% of the national income at the beginning of the decade 
to 10.7% or 12.8% respectively, in 1965 and 1966.16
11
Since Brazil
5and other Latin American countries became short of local invest­
ment capital, they sought foreign funds in the belief that
17increased investment would lead to economic prosperity. Brazil
eagerly took advantage of the readily available and relatively
inexpensive foreign bank loans in the 1970s because of the
shortage of investment capital.
The ISI policies thus left a legacy of economic problems
that seriously affected Brazil*s balance of payments position.
By the 1960s, the neglect of international trade during the ISI
18years had placed the country in a dangerous situation. The
ISI policies, in effect, were detrimental to the export sector
as exports were neglected during this period. Long periods of
exchange rate overvaluation were said to have acted as a restraint
19on the expansion of both traditional and new exports as well.
The significance of this neglect of exports is that it placed
Brazil in a dangerous balance of payments position, since a decline
in export earnings necessitating a reduction of imports led to
20industrial stagnation. The result of this was a massive 
accumulation of account deficits and foreign debt.
After twenty years of ISI, Brazil's debt had grown tremen­
dously for another reason. The- increased debt also resulted 
from the increase in imports for parts, technology, raw materials, 
and oil that was needed for industrialization. These imported 
intermediary products had to be paid for with dollars. However, 
because of the decrease in exports, not enough foreigngft&aB»ned 
to pay for these imports. Brazil was then forced to borrow 
money in order to finance imports . The result was a massive
6increase in Brazil's foreign debt.
Thus, Brazil's foreign debt began growing in the 1960s, long
before the crisis of the 1970s. Brazil's balance of payments
problems resulted from the growth in the 1950s which was financed
in large part by foreign capital consisting of direct investments
and loans. Many of the loans were short-term, and both interest
and amortization payments produced increasing balance of payments
21difficulties. The foreign debt had already reached more than 
$2 billion by the 1960s, Because ISI policies had been so one­
sided, the Brazilian economic system was already in crisis by 
the end of the 1960s, even before the 1970s world debt crisis.
It is from this general bac kground that the 1970s and present 
crises can be examined. During this period, foreign bank lending 
to Latin American countries increased dramatically. The oil 
shock was one of the events which led to this explosion of bank 
lending. The surplus funds from OPEC price rises meant that 
more money was recycled through the western-controlled world 
financial system. Most of the surplus money was channeled from 
the oil-rich nations to the private commercial banking sector.
The international capital markets experienced an explosive 
growth--from $20 billion in 1973 to $2,000 billion in 1982--becoming
the single most important channel for the transfer of savings
22from surplus to deficit countries. These banks were eager to 
put the capital to productive use and readily extended loans to 
Brazil.
In light of today's crisis, many question the reason why 
bankers made such huge loans which turned out so badly. One
nI
explanation for the loans is that banks exploited loopholes in 
federal regulations designed to limit the amount of money they
were permitted to lend any one borrower in order to make profits.
For example, loans were made to the Brazilian government and state-
owned oil company, Petrobras, arguing that since they were legally
distinct entities, each was entitled to borrow up to the legally
24permissible limit. The result of such interpretations by the
banks was that they boosted their loans to Brazil far above the
limits prescribed by U.S. regulations.
Another explanation for the frenzied bank lending claims
that the information about borrowers was limited and flawed,
and because of the pressure of excess liquidity - "too much
money and intense competition” - bankers did not pay much attention
25to the data that was available. Likewise, loan applications
were only hastily reviewed to see if the project was economically
sound and if the borrower could at least pay interest. Bankers'
salaries, promotions and bonuses were awarded on the basis of
2 6how many loans wire made, not by how many loans were repaid.
Thus, it was in the bankers' interests to make as many loans 
as possible.
Others have argued that at the time, the banks' approach to 
lending did not appear unreasonable. Whether or not banks 
would lend a country money depended on an assessment of that 
country's credit-worthiness which was calculated by examining 
the ratio of debt service payments to exports. Because developing 
countries were growing rapidly and maintaining healthy export 
levels, their debt service to export ratio did not change
23
8over the course of the decade. Thus, Brazil and other nations 
were able to borrow heavily after being deemed "credit-worthy." 
Optimism that the economic conditions and high export levels 
of the 1970s would continue was an underlying rationale for the 
enormous amounts of bank lending.
Brazil's increased borrowing during this period can also
be explained by several reasons. By borrowing abroad, capital
could be channeled to local businesses and economic growth
could be achieved without losing control of the local economy
to foreign corporations. Foreign finance was also expected to
spur industrial expansion; to build new productive facilities?
develop natural resources? produce basic inputs (steel and energy)?
fuel modern industry? and provide cheap, often subsidized
28supplies to domestic industrial firms. Foreign loans would 
enable industries to increase the production of goods and thus raise 
the output of products which could be sold on overseas markets.
As industry and exports expanded, part of the increased export 
earnings could be used to service the debt.
Thus, with the new imported capital borrowed at low interest 
rates, Brazil was able to finance a major program of industrial 
expansion. For example, the international banking community 
lent money to Brazil's state-owned steel industry* This 
industry was able to expand its capacity, increasing the number 
of orders it placed with local private industry. Part of the 
production of the steel mills was exported in order to service the 
foreign debt. This boost to the steel industry provided new 
impetus for the shipbuilding industry and resulted in Brazil
27
9entering the top ranks of the world shipbuilding industry. In
addition, Brazil built up its state-owned petroleum industry by
expanding plants* existing capacities and constructing new ones.
Brazil also undertook construction of a Fiat car plant in Betim
in 1974. In the south of the country, they built the Itaipu
hydroelectric power plant, the largest in the world. Foreign
capital also went toward the Carajas mining complex. Brazil
also modernized its transportation system in the cities.
Millions of dollars were pumped into its alternative fuels
program, proalcool, as thousands of distilleries were set up.
By far the biggest Brazilian debtor was Electrobas, the national
electric energy holding company, which accounts for nearly
one-tenth of all domestic investment, half of which is financed 
29abroad. Foreign finance thus accounted for nearly one-sixth
30of all Brazilian domestic investment in the 1970s.
Foreign financing thus spurred dramatic advances in industrial
production and economic development. Between 1960 and 1980,
31Brazil's GDP quadrupled. Brazilian exports also increased from
$1.7 billion in 1967 to over $20 billion in 1980. Exports of
manufactured goods in particular increased from virtually
32nothing to over $10 billion during the same period. Overall 
economic growth ensued in the 1970s, bring rising productivity, 
the growth of capital, and industrialization to Brazil.
Despite the expansion of Brazilian industry, economic growth 
did not last for long. The continued success of this system rested
upon Brazil's ability to increase exports and keep debt payments
33within reasonable limits. In 1979, several factors emerged
10
which sabotaged these two prerequisites of continued growth.
A major factor leading to the decline in Brazil*s growth
rate and debt crisis was the North American and Western
European recession during the late 1970s which led to a slowdown
in the volume of growth of world trade and in Latin American
exports. Because 70% of Latin American exports are bought by
industrialized nations, their economies are vulnerable to the
demand in the developed countries. The world recession thus led
to falling prices for most non-oil export commodities and a
decrease in demand for imported goods. The European Economic
Community*s declining demand for Brazilian steel meant, for
example, that sales of foundry products dropped from 254,000 tons
35in 1980 to 157,000 tons in the first ten months of 1982. At
the same time, protectionism in the industrialized countries
increased in order to keep out Latin American imports. Since
exports were the most important source of finance for Brazil,
the cost of servicing the debt drastically increased as the
number of export markets diminished.
Overall, the Brazilian economy as a whole faltered around
1979 because of the world-wide recession. By 1981 the industrial
sector recorded its first and largest decline in about 20 years.
The car industry and machinery and equipment sectors saw negative
growth at the onset of 1981. The gross domestic product (GDP)
also declined, falling from 11.3% between 1967 and 1973 to 5.4%
36during 1974 and 1983. Industrial output also fell, dropping
from 12.7% in the first period to only 5.4% between 1974 and 
371983.
11
Another factor which worsened Brazil's economic situation
during this period was the high interest rates on burrowed money
which affected the amount Brazil had to find to service their
debts and made new borrowing more expensive. Much of Brazil's
outstanding debt was composed of short term finance, lent at
floating interest rates, so that interest increases showed up
quickly in debt service figures. The increase in the U.S. prime
lending rate went from 11% in 1979 to over 20% by 1981 which
meant disaster for Brazil , as their interest payments on their
38debt. soared. The $11.5 billion of required interest
39payments swamped its $6.3 billion trade surplus. By 1982
Brazil's economy was increasingly burdened as their debt service
ratio (interest and principal payments as a share of expert
39earnings) increased to 78%. There was also less recycling of
petroleum dollars by western banks after 1979 which meant that less
surpluses of money were entering the banking system and there
40was less to lend out. This worsened the situation because 
it became increasingly difficult for Brazil to pay back debts 
due to the high interest rates and also affected their ability 
to borrow money.
The 19708 crisis also stems from the debts Brazil
accumulated from their policy of rapid industrial expansion.
They were able, however, to offset part of the debt incurred
from their industrial expansion by a strengthening of their
export performance and the growth of international reserves held
41by the government. However, the expansion of industry increased 
the demand for petroleum-based products. Brazil's fuel alcohol
12
program helped substitute for petroleum but could not completely
replace it. The remainder of the oil Brazil needed had to be
imported from oil producing countries. Thus, the high oil
prices meant that they were faced with an increased oil bill,
and by 1981, petroleum products accounted for over one half
of Brazil's import bill. The import bill increased as the price
of oil increased, resulting in a worsening of the debt.
As a result of the above circumstances (the fall in exports,
increased interest rates, the world recession and the oil
shock), Brazil's balance of payments situation became considerably
42more serious after 1979. Consequently, Brazil's foreign exchange
position was already quite unfavorable at the beginning of
1982. By the end of 1982, Brazil's international reserves were
negative by several billion dollars, falling from $7.5 billion in
43December 1981 to only $4 billion by December 1982.
Between 1977 and 1983, the debt increased by $57 billion from 
$35 to $92 billion, making Brazil the world's largest debtor.
85% of this increased debt represented borrowing to pay interest.
By the fall of 1982, it had become nearly impossible for Brazil 
to continue servicing its foreign debt. In November the govern­
ment declared its intention to seek access to IMF funds.
Since the debt cris in 1982, Brazil has been involved in 
rescheduling its external debt. Two-thirds of the debt is owed 
to foreign commercial banks and several hundred individual credit
institutions from the United States, Europe, Japan, and other 
44countries. The problems of coordinating and keeping all these 
interest8 in balance has been a major challenge for Brazilian
13
authorities. The negotiating process has been difficult at
best as Brazil remains the world's largest debtor. Because of
the importance of this issue for Brazil in the short and long-
run, it is necessary to examine Brazil's economic policies in
order to understand why the debt problem persists today.
At the end of 1982, Brazil declared a moratorium on the
principal of its debt yet continued paying interest and dividends
while negotiating with the IMF and main creditors. Brazil
began negotiations with the IMF despite its aversion to the
institution. Since the fifties, the IMF has been considered by
Brazilians as a "representative of the international financial
system, incapable of understanding the characteristics of
45underdeveloped countries." It was felt that the IMF's
stabilization plans which use severe monetary and fiscal policies,
tend to induce recession or solve the problem of inflation at a
social and economic cost that is not proportionate to the
4 8results achieved.
Brazil had two alternatives at the end of 1982 * to declare a
complete moratorium or to declare a moratorium of the principal
and continue paying the current interest and dividends while
4 7negotiating with the IMF and main banks. As previously noted, 
Brazil chose the second alternative. Thus, in order to meet their 
repayment obligations, Brazil had to go to the IMF to get its 
"seal of approval" which would unlock larger amounts of new 
finance from governments and private lenders. In January of 1982, 
Brazil signed a letter of intent with the IMF which promised 
$6 billion of trade surplus, a cut in the public deficit to half its
14
size, and a 90% inflation rate. In order to achieve a trade
surplus, however, Brazil was forced to follow an IMF austerity plan
which reduced domestic consumption and workers' living standards
in order to free resources for export so that hard currency export
49earnings could be applied to the debt service. In exchange for
these targets, Brazil would receive new loans from the IMF and
the main international banks. It was hoped that this money would
be sufficient to pay the interest or current accounts in 1983.
By April, however, it became apparent that this proposal would
not be met as initially planned. The $6 billion trade was achieved
but only because of a very strong recession that cut imports.
Inflation, on the other hand, increased from 100% to 180% by the
end of the year because of the maxidevaluation of the cruzeiro
50and other price measures recommended by the IMF. The target
for reducing the public deficit was also not reached. Likewise,
the new money given from international banks was not enough for
Brazil to meet its balance of payments in 1983. This was due to
foreign banks' reluctance to increase short-term financing because
51of growing doubts concerning Brazil's trustworthiness. As a
result of Brazil's failure to meet all the planned targets, the
IMF demanded further austerity measures and a new round of
negotiations was started halfway through 1983.
During the second round of negotiations, new financing was
designed to meet the credit requirements for 1984 and cover the
shortfalls of the 1983 program. One change that was made was the
application to the Paris Club to reschedule amortizations and
52interest due on loans from foreign governments. Previously,
48
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only medium- and long-term amortizations were rescheduled. Despite
these changes, \:he new agreement with the IMF basically retained
all the major characteristics of the first agreement. For
example, the second agreement continued the IMF's demand for a
lessening of the current account deficit and decreased inflation.
Like the first program, this one did not allow an appreciable
increase of international reserves.
The IMF's austerity programs have had a significant impact
not only on the Brazilian economy but on the people as well.
Brazil's Finance Minister Dilson Funaro severely criticized the
austerity measures imposed by the IMF which were designed
to stop inflation and manage the debt crisis. These policies, he
claims, have "led to a recession where the jobless cannot buy milk
53or meat and malnutrition and infant mortality have increased." 
Laborunions, local businessmen, and others whose income and 
consumption were reduced by the austerity measures have opposed 
the plan. Food riots sta: sd in Brazil as slum dwellers on the 
outskirts of the cities were driven to near starvation. Better- 
off workers in the modern industrial sector were also negatively 
affected by the austerity measures. The industrial depression 
stemming from such measures resulted in a wave of labor combat­
iveness. The urban middle class was also affected since they
54became prosperous primarily as government employment grew.
Since the austerity programs cut state spending, government 
employees' salaries and jobs were cut. Much of the middle class 
turned from conservatism to protest to defend the public sector
5c .against attacks by foreign creditors. 3 Thus, it was widely felt
16
that Brazil's financial policy was being conducted with an
eye toward ensuring that banks get repaid, irrespective of what
56happened to the local economy or domestic standards of living*
The severest criticism, however, came from the business community.
Manufacturers of goods had prospered during the previous years
of expansion. As government spending was cut, however, orders
for capital goods were cut, and industries suffered. Opposition
to Brazil's economic policy grew as more and more once prosperous
firms became bankrupt and massive unemployment ensued. Brazilian
businessmen's new revulsion to the consequences of foreign
borrowing and the governments tuat encouraged such policies
57made them leading critics of tbs regimes in power. And 
Brazil's leading business group declared in 1983 that, "it is 
reckless to subject Brazil to a repressive adjustment of un­
certain duration...the prolonged shrinkage of productive activity 
will inevitably lead to the destruction of Brazilian private in­
dustry and could even threaten the continuance of the free
C Oenterprise system." The Brazilian government, as a consequence, 
found itself torn between making debt payments and meeting the 
needs of its people.
Burdened with debt, unemployment, and rising inflation,
i
several plans were initiated in an attempt to confrony^he world
and Brazilian debt crisis. The Bradley in particular did not resolve
the Brazilian or world debt crisis. Senator Bradley's plan
advocated a large write-offi 3% of the outstanding principal
on the debt for the largest 15 debtors in the next 3 years, and re-
59duction in interest rates paid to service the debt by 3%.
17
In return, Latin American countries would ease trade restrictions.
This plan, however, may have provided temporary debt relief if
implemented, but only at the banks* expense. The reduction in
outstanding principal and interest rates would result in a $50.
6 0billion loss for banks. These banks would also not be 
compensated for these by industrialized countries' governments.
In addition, this plan did not take into consideration the 
fact that there is no legal mechanism which can force internation­
al banks to give up their claims on repayment of principal 
and interest.
As Brazil struggled to find an answer to its economic
problems, they implemented the Cruzado plan in an attempt to stop
inflation and stimulate the economy. In order to avoid the
crippling IMF austerity programs, Brazil needed a plan that would
foster economic growth and pull the economy out of recession.
Jose Sarney hoped that the Cruzado plan would help Brazil expand
its productivity and create jobs in order increase exports, the
only source of foreign exchange for financing the debt. It was also
hoped that this plan wouldcontrol the runaway inflation that
distorted prices and purchasing power. The end result of the
Cruzado plan turned out much differently,than anticipated. The
long term effects of this plan were not foreseen as it caused the
debt crisis to reaach a new unmanageable level by the end of 1986.
Until this reform, inflation had been running at a 250% annual 
61rate. The Cruzado plan contained four main parts designed to 
achieve its intended goalsi a total price freeze, an end to Brazil's 
cost of living indexes, increases in minimum wages, and the replace-
18
6 2ment of the cruzeiro with the cruzado as the new unit of currency.
In the short run, the plan was successful as expectations were for
the most part satisfied. Inflation was held to less than 5%
and price stability became a reality. One million new jobs
were added, the GNP surged at a 10% annual rate, and a large
6 3trade surplus was bestowed upon Brazil. Interest rates also 
fell to less than 50% annually. Although this plan was success­
ful in the short run, the government did not foresee the economic 
problems it would exacerbate as Brazil is now unable to meet 
payments on. its $107 billion foreign debt.
Under the plan, prices were frozen across the board on items 
ranging from raw materials and consumer goods to durable goods 
and services. Consumers reacted with a consumption spree which 
changed the whole thrust of the economy from speculation to
production. Factories which ran at half capaacity in the severe
64recession of the 1980s could not keep up with the new demand.
As interest rates were lowered by savings institutions, people
began to withdraw their savings to buy durables and luxuries that
65they could not previously afford.
The Cruzado plan differed considerably from previous IMF 
austerity plans. The Cruzado plan sought to increase consumption 
in order to stimulate economic growth. They achieved this goal 
by increasing wages and decreasing prices which stimulated 
buying. The result was an increase in industry's production 
that could not even keep up with consumer demand. IMF plans on 
the other hand involve decreasing consumption in order to free 
this exchange for servicing the debt. Under IMF policies,
19
businesses suffer greatly from austerity measures which cut state 
spending and dry up foreign finance. As a result, industry 
that had expanded as a result of government orders suddenly 
finds that these orders have dried up. The people suffer perhaps 
the most as they are forced to accept reductions in wages and 
consumption. The IMF also insists on import controls to achieve 
more favorable balance of payments positions. The Brazilian 
people eagerly embraced the Cruzado plan since it improved 
their standards of living immensely.
Enforcing the plan was difficult, however, as the govern­
ment relied on Brazilian citizens to monitor prices and make sure 
stores were complying with price freezes. Any violations were to be 
reported to federal and state authorities. According to President 
Jose Sarney,Mthe prompt reaction of the people to price controls 
aroused a popular movement without precedent in Brazilian 
history.” This popular support soon died down as the second 
more stringent stage of the program was implemented. This part 
of the program drastically increased taxes in order to curb 
consumer buying power which was pushing up prices despite
official restraints. Taxes almost doubled prices for cars,
6 7fuel, cigarettes, and alcohol.
Opposition to the Cruazdo plan grew among other sectors as
well. Agricultural and -industrial Interests both sought an end
to the price freeze. Businessmen withheld their goods rather
than sell them at fixed prices. Farmers, for example, refused
to sell their herds and produce at fixed prices which led to a
68beef shortage for the first time in two decades. Other shortages
20
of consumer goods occured simply as a result of excess demand and the 
unwillingness of suppliers to sell at low prices. The excess of 
demand manifested itself through the emergence of black markets 
which permeated the economy.
By February of 1987, it became apparent that the Cruzado
69plan was," an extraordinarily mistaken policy." Eleven months
after its inception, under the forces of shortages and a growing
black market, the Cruzado plan collapsed. Although the Cruzado
plan brought inflation to zero, it did not eliminate its causes.
According to economist Forto Goncalves of the Getulio Vargas
Foundation, "Inflation can not be eliminated through decree or
70through price freezes." Triple digit inflation is now on its 
way back since the plan's demise. The government lifted the 
price freeze and inflation rates are predicted to reach 500% 
this year.
The most important consequence of the failure of the Cruzado 
plan is that the country's debt crisis has flared up again. Six 
months ago when the economy began booming under the Cruzado plan, 
it appeared that Brazil was overcoming its debt problems. The 
monthly trade surplus during this period averaged more than
71$1 billion and foreign exchange reserves exceeded $11 billion.
It appeared that Brazil would also get significant concessions 
from its creditors and be a credit-worthy borrower once again.
This hope, however, proved illusory as trade surpluses fell 
significantly during the later part of the Cruzado plan. Along 
with the unprecedented consumer spending boom came an increase in 
imports and exports being channeled instead- into the local economy.
21
This made the country's foreign exchange reserved and trade surplus
plummet, bringing back the debt * crisis. The trade surplus fell to
between $150 million and $200 million since October, while reserves
used to cover debt payments reportedly have slumped to under 
72$4 billion. In January 1987, Brazil's monthly trade surplus
73fell to $129 million, the lowest in four years. This decline
of trade surpluses significantly affected Brazil's ability to
service its debt payments. It is expected now, however, that with
the end of the Cruzado plan the government will allow exchange
rates to stabilize at a level that will promote increased foreign 
74trade. There will hopefully be an increase in Brazil's trade 
surplus which will make it easier to make payments on its $107 
billion debt.
The failure of this plan has led to Brazil's present economic 
situation. President Jose Sarney announced in February that 
Brazil would suspend interest payments on its $67 billion medium 
and long-term debt owed to private banks for an unspecified 
period of time. Sarney did not repudiate Brazil's debt but 
said that interest payments would not be resumed until banks 
gave Brazil better terms. Brazil will thus continue paying interest 
on the $40 billion it owes to international lending institutions 
such as theWorld Bank and foreign governments. Brazil became unable 
to meet its debt service payments because of the decline in 
foreign reserves brought on by the dramatic decrease in Brazil's 
trade surplus. Sarney issued this moratorium because he does not 
want Brazil to pay its debt \yy sacrificing development and 
provoking internal imbalance. According to Sarney, "We cannot
22
pay the debt with the hunger of our people."
Instead, Sarney is asking for a restructuring of the debt on
more favorable terms in the next round of debt negotiations in New
York, Unlike other debtor countries, Brazil wants to negotiate
directly with creditor nations* governments to resolve its debt
problems. In past negotiations, Federal Reserve Board chairman
Paul Volcker held together the international debt structure by
getting creditor banks to agree to new terms and financings. This
time, however, Volcker may not be able to handle the situation
as was previously done since banks are divided over what approach
to take towards restructuring, Citicorp, for example, insists
that the terms of restructuring be made as strict as possible,
allowing few concessions for debtor countries. Sovran Financial
Corporation and 35 to 40 other regional banks do not plan on
giving additional funds to Brazil or other debtors. "Why should
we when we don*t think it will be paid back?" asked James
7 6Kirkpatrick, a Sovran senior vice president. Most banks however
prefer a softer approach than Citi. corp and the big regionals to
guard against the possible collapse of Third World economies.
The position of the banks is even stronger today because
they are in a better bargaining position than they were during the
1982 crisis. Some banks feel they are able to resist further
concessions sought by debtor countries because of the extensive
reserves that they have built up. Even the threat of global
financial ruin, once a powerful incentive to keep Third World
77loans current at any cost, has dimmed, This is true because 
many banks, especially European and Japanese ones, have built
75
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reserves and capital and seem capable of preventing a sudden
collapse. European banks in particular are "less inclined than
before to throw good money after bad to keep credit alive," says
7 8MIT's 'John Dornbusch. Some banks are taking losses rather
than loaning new money. The Republic Bank of New York, for
example, took $40 million of losses on a mixture of sovereign
79Mexican, Brazilian, and Argentinian debt.
Despite the relatively better position of some banks, U.S. 
banks* profits may be drastically affected. In the short run, 
if Brazil*s debts are unpaid for over 90 days, U.S. banks can by 
law no longer count the anticipated interest payments on these loans 
as actual income, affecting their bottom lines. In the long run, 
there would also be an effect on banks’ bottom lines if the debt 
goes unpaid. At the Institute for International Economics 
in Washington, William R. Cline, an international debt expert 
estimates that if the Brazil problem is not resolved by the middle
80of next year, it will probably knock about 40% off big bank profits.
Another feared result of Brazil's declared moratorium is that
other Latin American countries will follow suit. Paul Volcker said
that the possibility that Brazil's action could influence other
81debtor nations, "is always a potential problem." Argentina,
for example, said that it may follow Brazil's lead and declare a
moratorium unless commercial banks provided more than $2 billion
82in new financing. The Dominican Republic as well may suspend 
payments on its $5 billion debt. President Alan Garcia of Peru 
supported Brazil's move, saying that it confirmed the correctness 
of their own decision to limit payments on its debt.
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The debt crisis has had a very destabilizing effect not only 
on Brazil's economy but on the United States as well. In 
particular, U.S. workers have suffered from the debt crisis.
Over one million jobs have been lost due to Third World
8 3austerity measures which swelled exports and decreased imports.
The crisis has added half a percentage point to U.S. unemployment
84each year and billions to the budget deficit. The Latin
American market for U.S. exports has also seriously declined because
of the curtailment of imports, resulting in an $11 billion loss of
8 5exports to Latin America between 1981 and 1985. Because of 
the serious impact of the crisis on U.S. and Brazilian 
economies, it is in their interest to find a solution to the debt 
problem.
At present, there are no easy solutions for managing the 
debt and it remains the foremost challenge facing Brazil. Until 
a new renegotiation plan is reached between Brazil and the banka, 
the present moratorium will continue to adversely affect both 
parties. Brazil needs short-term policies to deal with the 
crisis in the immediate future and must also formulate long-term 
developmental policies to deal with the debt. The outcome of 
the situation depends upon several factors including the willing­
ness of Brazil and the banks to work together to reach a debt 
relief plan.
In the immediate future, Brazil must arrange a new debt 
renegotiation plan with its creditors. Restructuring the debt 
is necessary to extend current and approaching maturities; this 
allows billions of dollars in new money to be available for debt 
service payments. Thus, Brazil is currently seeking $20 billion in
25
loans in the next f~ve years to finance debt payments. This
would be an effective way to deal with the repayment problem, but
only in the short run. Since Brazil lacks the foreign currency to
pay back both the interest and principal of the debt, this policy
would enable them to repay part of the debt, but only by borrowing
more. There are several problems with this approach. One problem
is that it calls for banks to reschedule the debt and lend new
money, yet it has become increasingly difficult for Brazil to get
new loans. Banks are hesistant to "throw good money after bad"
8 7and increase exposure to bad credit risks. The U.S. Congress
and taxpayers are also extremely unwilling to come up with even
88small sums of extra money to grant short-terrn relief. The
effects of such a bailout on the U.S. economy would be uncalculable
89as inflation and heavier taxes would be the expected results.
In addition, no new loans are likely to be made until the present 
stalemate between Brazil and tv. banks is broken and payments 
are resumed.
Another problem with increased bank lending is that by borrow­
ing more, Brazil will only exacerbate the debt problem in the long 
run. Rescheduling only changes the timing and not the volume 
of the debt. Bankers have carried the foreign debts on their 
books at face value although some say that its actual value has 
fallen. This has been done through repeated restructurings that 
supply new loans to help cover interest on old ones, keeping the
credits technically current, but piling more debt on the Third
90World's shoulders. The result has been an increase in Third World
91debt from $752 billion to $888 billion between 1982 and 1987.
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The heart of the problem is that bankers must lend money so
that Brazil can pay interest on old loans. 85% of Brazil*s
increased debt between 1977 and 1983 represented borrowing to
91pay interest. Additional borrowing increases the total debt.
New lending means higher interest payments in the future and a
second round of additional lending to pay the rapidly increasing
interest bills. Thus, borrowing more and more to pay interest only
puts Brazil deeper in debt and no closer to servicing its payments.
Much of the increased debt therefore results from high
interest rates which keep interest payments at unaffordable
levels. For Brazil, the ratio of interest payments to export earnings
is not expected to fall significantly below the level that sparked
92the crises in 1982 and 1983. Brazil therefore does not benefit
from achieving new trade surpluses by decreasing consumption and
increasing investment since this money gets turned over to banks
in the form of interest payments. Since countries must
borrow to manage the debt, many Latin American debtors have proposed
limiting the amount of interest they are required to pay. In
particular, the Latin American Economic System (SELA) has formulated
a plan calling for steep reduction in the volume of export earnings
93committed to interest payments. This proposal calls for interest
payments to be based on the ability to pay and not on some
predetermined interest rate. It also recommends that Latin American
countries use only 15 to 25% of their earnings to service the
debt. This policy would help Brazil since they currently use
9444% of export earnings for debt service payments. The plan 
also states that if export earnings increase, the percentage paid 
to banks would increase proportionally.
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The advantages of such a policy are numerous. Debtor nations
would benefit as they would save nearly $15 billion a year from
95reduced interest payments. They would no longer have to borrow
more and increase exports to pay interest since the debt would
decrease once interest payments declined. In addition, money
previously used to service the debt could be used for domestic
consumption and investment instead. It could also be used for
expansion and modernization of the production sector, resulting
96in an improvement of Brazil*s debt servicing capacity. There 
costs, however, to this plan since bankers would suffer losses 
from decreased interest payments. Bankers would also be less 
inclined to make additional loans to countries that partially 
defaulted on payments.
Some leaders have suggested going one step further and 
defaulting on payments altogether. Several Brazilian officials 
feel that the most viable and profitable option would be total
97repudiation since the debt is too astronomical to be paid back.
They also argue that using whatever foreign exchange that can be
earned to be spent on reducing the debt would simply make Brazil*s
98economic situation more unstable. This would reduce invest­
ment in development which would lead to unemployment. It would 
also mean curtailing imports which could bring about a scarcity of 
imported goods and such necessities as food. The final impact 
would be hardship for the Brazilian people who would suffer as 
a result•
This alternative, however, would only be advantageous for 
Brazil. They could start anew and develop economically without 
the burden of the debt looming over the country. Like the SELA
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plan, Brazil could use the money spent to service he debt and
use it instead to boost economic growth and standards of living.
They would therefore be relieved of all responsibility of the debt
while bankers would be burdened with the bill. This could put the
banking system in jeopardy since the banks have lent 2 >0% of their
capital and reserves to the Third World, with §290 billion of it
99to Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. If Brazil alone were to default, 
many of the banks would operate in the red for years to come.*^ 
This policy would be rejected by industrialized nations for this 
reason as well as another; namely that taxpayers in the industrial­
ized nations whose banks lent money would not be eager or willing
101to pick up the check for Brazil's defaulting. Finally, it
would destroy Brazil's credit-worthiness since no bank would want
to risk lending money again. This would seriously affect Brazil's
ability to borrow funds for future development projects. It
would also close off larger and more valuable access to foreign
102reserves, assets, credits, markets, and technology.
A long-term policy is therefore needed which will facilitate
debt servicing while promoting economic growth. Such a solution
arises from the recognition of the link between poor economic
growth, high debt and international trade. Stimulating economic
development through export expansion and increased private
investment may offer the most effective way out of the debt
103crisis in the long run. Simply borrowing more and more money 
to pay back the interest and principal of the debt only 
exacerbates the problem in the long run; real economic development 
will enable Brazil to expand the economy and earn the foreign 
currency necessary to repay the debt.
Export promotion in particular is a possible solution.
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Without foreign trade, the foreign exchange necessary to repay the
debt cannot be acquired. Countries following an outward, market-
sensitive orientation for long periods have been better able to
weather debt difficulties than those relying less on market
104forces to guide economic policies. Following a switch in
trade policies from ISI to export promotion, Brazil*s export 
growth rates increased considerably. As a result of this new 
trade outlook, Brazil experienced an especially rapid growth of
105manufactured exports, an important precursor of economic growth.
Such an outward-looking policy may help Brazil achieve trade
surpluses necessary for adjusting its balance of payments deficit.
H wever, the combination of debt problems and poor economic
growth throughout the world has pushed trade in a restrictive 
1 0 6direction. The developed countries have adopted strict limits
on imports and have implemented protectionist measures to keep
out foreign goods. The result of this is that it has become
increasingly difficult for Brazil to expand its export market.
Access to industrialized nations' markets is necessary if Brazil
is to lessen the balance of payments deficits and earn much needed
foreign exchange. In 1983, for example, only 8% of Brazil's GNP
came from exports,much less than half of the total exports of
107developed nations.
Brazil's ability to expand exports depends upon actions of 
industrialized nations. The willingness of industrialized 
countries to adopt trade liberalizing measures will depend, in 
part, on the actions of developing countries*.If developing countries 
postpone liberalization of their own markets, arguing the need to
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limit imports while expanding exports, industrialized countries
will face increased trade deficits. Their exports will have
slowed at the same time that they must absorb increased imports
from Latin American nations. Some industrializd nations may
therefore not adopt such measures because they may feel they are
108losing export markets while being forced to absorb imports.
President Jose Sarney has asked that U„S. markets be
opened to Brazilian products while Brazil continues to protect
109some of its own markets. Sarney also stated that the "U.S.
must understand his country*s needs because an unstable Brazil means 
an unstable South America, and an unstable South America, is really, 
a serious problem for the whole world.M**^ The U.S.* willing­
ness to accept this demand will have a serious impact on Brazil*s 
growth since nearly one quarter of Brazil's exports are bought 
by the U.S. It appears, however, that international trade may be 
moving to a more liberalizing track as the finance ministers of 
the United States, European Economic Community, Japan, and Canada 
have been seeking such an end. They have all agreed on the 
necessity of reducing tariffs and removing barriers on the imports 
of Brazil and other lesser developed countries. The U.S.t for one, 
boosted its imports from Brazil by 60% in 1984.***
Another proposed strategy for accelerating economic develop­
ment is increasing private investment in Brazil. Without massive
112investments, Brazil cannot sustain its 7% yearly growth rate.
And without that growth, the country cannot attend to **the other 
Brazil, the marginal part, the landless rural, the jobless urban
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worker, the children without families. Increased private invest­
ment has several advantages over private bank lending. First, there 
are no fixed interest payments which are attached to private 
investment. This differs from bank loans which were sometimes 
invested in unprofitable projects and which required payments 
when interest came due. Some also feel that private investment
is a superior method of transferring technology and managerial
114expertise to Brazil. This is essential if developing countries
are going to improve their productive capabilities, and diversify
115and expand their economies and international tratio potential.
There is no agreement, however, among leaders that 
private investment plays a beneficial and important role in 
helping resolve the debt problem. Some leaders see foreign invest­
ment as a source of economic exploitation and a threatto national 
sovereignty. As a result, Brazil continued to maintain an
investment regime that both repels and attracts investos. On the 
one hand, Brazil desperately wants the U.S. to buy and invest more 
since it recognizes the importance of the U.S. to its future 
development. At the same time, Brazil cannot escape a fear of
economic domination going back to 1700 when Queen Maria I of
117Portugal ordered textile factories closed. So Brazil fears
foreign investors even as it courts them.
One manifestation of this fear is the "informatics law" 
which bans the importation of small computers or their manufacture 
by foreign-owned companies in Brazil. The effect of this law is 
that U.S. companies have been frozen out of many high-tech markets. 
Dow Chemical's manager of industrial products in Brazil states
113
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that," Brazil says they want investments, but they won't get them
118if they go the way of the informatics law." Until Brazil
eases such restrictions on private investment, the investment 
capital needed for development will be in short supply.
Promoting exports and private investment may therefore enable 
Brazil to develop and earn money to service debt payments. The 
ability of Brazil to actually do this depends upon several factors.
For instance, investment is likely to increase if Brazil maintains 
an investment regime that attracts rather than repels investors.
In addition, exports can be promoted only if industrialized 
countries are willing to open their markets to Brazilian products.
The result would be increased exports and foreign exchange earnings 
for Brazil. Even if the United States, Europe and Japan were 
to drop all barriers to developing country exports, such liberal­
ization would apply to only about $4 billion of their trade initially, 
and even the increased exports that high debt countries could 
generate under such circumstances would go only part of the way
toward paying off the more than $800 billion in debt now outstand- 
119ing. Although trade is not the sole solution to the debt
120crisis, it is the key to the solution. Brazil must be able to 
sell its goods to service the debts. If access to markets abroad 
is impaired through protectionism, the developed world will be
121condemning the indebted nations to perpetual financial crisis.
Brazil's $107 billion debt has had a destabilizing impact 
on all aspects of society and remains the biggest obstacle to 
economic development. Burdened by austerity measures, business 
and industry experienced little growth • Banks alec stand to lose 
vast amounts of money if the present moratorium is not resolved.
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The ultimate victims of the crisis, however, are the Brazilian 
people who suffer as recession, unemployment and inflation 
continuously plague the country and adversely affect their 
standard of living.
The current economic problems may also challenge Brazil's
struggle for democracy. The economic turmoil has begun to take
its toll politically as critics of the government have increased
their attacks on Jose Sarney and his economic advisors. In addition,
recent opinion polls indicate that the public has lost confidence
in the government's ability to respond to t l * failure of the
122Cruzado plan. If the democratically elected Sarney government
fails to meet the present economic challenges, the possibility
12 3exists that the military could resume control.
Whether Brazil will successfully overcome this crisis still 
remains to be seen. Several factors, some which are not in Brazil's 
control, will determine if economic recovery will occur. For 
instance, if interest rates remain high, interest payments wili 
remain at unaffordable levels and Brazil will not be able to meet 
its debt payments. If the banks accept Brazil's proposal asking 
for $20 billion in loans over the next five years, Brazil will 
be able to deal with the repayment problem in the short run.
However, Brazil's ability to deal with its debt payments in the 
long run is also contingent upon their ability to earn enough 
foreign exchange. Protectionism will hinder Brazil's export eari ng 
capacity; therefore, industrialized countries 'markets must be open 
to Brazilian exports if they are to earn enough currency to repay 
part of the debt. Brazil's ultimate ability to service its debt 
thus depends upon the successful interaction of numerous variables. 
The success or failure they encounter when trying to solve the debt 
will have a tremendous impact on all sectors of Brazil's society.
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